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Introduction
For the last fifty years, Boston’s Chinatown
has been a shrinking community. Squeezed in
by highways on two sides, its land is being
gradually consumed by two medical institu-
tions, Tufts University Medical School and
New England Medical Center.1 During the
last few decades, these two medical institu-
tions have swallowed up nearly one third of
the land in Boston’s Chinatown.2 Despite this,
both medical institutions want more. In its
latest attempt at institutional expansion, New
England Medical Center made an offer to the
City of Boston in early 1993 to acquire a small
plot of land in Chinatown called Parcel C, for
the purposes of building an eight-story, four
hundred and fifty-five car garage on Parcel C.
No one could have foreseen what came
next—an astonishing outcry and level of
protest. Almost immediately, the Chinatown
community launched a fierce protest against
New England Medical Center’s attempt to
buy Parcel C. Literally thousands in this small
community came out in opposition against the
hospital’s proposed garage. 
The Chinatown community’s response to
New England Medical Center’s latest attempt
at expansion was important, however, not just
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“[T]he Coalition to Protect Parcel C for Chinatown effectively killed the garage with a skillfully
orchestrated media campaign and a series of high-profile events that painted the plan as a sellout
of the community.”
—Larry Smith, Chief Operating Officer
Boston Globe, October 22, 1994
Reprinted by permission from Amerasia Journal 21:3 (Winter 1995/1996): 99-119.
because it was vocal or widespread.
Ultimately, the struggle to stop the proposed
garage became more than a simple protest. It
evolved into a sophisticated, but impassioned,
grassroots movement, in which residents,
social service organizations, activists, and col-
lege students worked arm-in-arm with envi-
ronmental groups, legal services lawyers, pro-
gressive scientists, and health care advocacy
groups. Not only did the Chinatown commu-
nity stop a garage, it developed methods and
structures for community activism and grass-
roots organizing that will last well beyond this
struggle. 
The reasons for the widespread opposi-
tion against New England Medical Center’s
proposed garage, by what is normally a quiet
and politically inactive community, were vari-
ous and complex. Part of the Chinatown com-
munity’s intensely negative reaction to New
England Medical Center’s garage proposal
stemmed from the long history surrounding
Parcel C, and the always tense relationship
between Chinatown and New England
Medical Center over the land control issues.
Part of the reaction was pure self-preserva-
tion. Chinatown residents knew that New
England Medical Center’s garage was going to
present a significant environmental hazard to
their neighborhood. A great deal of the out-
rage, though, involved another party—the
City of Boston. In approving New England
Medical Center’s garage proposal, the City
government had broken an important promise
to Chinatown.
Boston’s Chinatown
Chinatown is forty-three acres in size. It has a
population of about 5,000, of which many are
recent immigrants.3 Over two-thirds of
Chinatown residents speak Chinese at home.4
Twenty eight percent of Chinatown residents
live below the federal government’s poverty
line.5
Chinatown has the distinction of being
the most crowded neighborhood in Boston,
with over 111 residents per acre.6 It also has
the least amount of open space per resident in
Boston, at a ratio of about a half-acre for
5,000 residents.7 There is a chronic shortage
of housing in Chinatown.8 Many recent
Chinese immigrants who wish to live in
Chinatown are often forced to find housing in
other communities.9
Not surprisingly, many of Chinatown’s
housing problems originate from the policies
of City Hall. A small, quiet neighborhood of
color with very few votes, Chinatown is not a
likely candidate to receive more benefits than
burdens from the political establishment. In
particular, like so many urban communities,
Chinatown’s housing and land development
problems have their roots in the City’s urban
renewal policies of the 1960’s.
During the era of urban renewal in
Boston, the Boston Redevelopment Authority,
which is the land development and zoning
agency for the City of Boston, took basically a
seize and destroy philosophy. The Authority
conducted wholesale taking of homes by emi-
nent domain in several neighborhoods,
including Chinatown. The Authority demol-
ished these homes, then sold the land to
developers for upscale housing, or in
Chinatown’s case, institutional use.10 In
Chinatown, it is estimated that over seven
hundred Chinatown residents were displaced
by urban renewal.11 Later on, much of this
land was sold to Tufts and New England
Medical Center.12
Highways are another cause of
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Chinatown’s problems. In the 1950’s and
1960’s, the federal government built two
major highways, the Massachusetts Turnpike
and the Southeast Expressway, straight
through the heart of Chinatown.13 Because of
these highways, Chinatown suffers from seri-
ous air pollution problems.14 Along with the
medical institutions, these highways are also
responsible for the chronic traffic congestion
in Chinatown.15 These problems are only pre-
dicted to worsen with the construction of one
of the major exit ramps for the new Central
Artery on the border of Chinatown.16 The
building of the highways are an additional rea-
son that Chinatown has a chronic housing
shortage, since their construction cost
Chinatown a large portion of its land base and
its housing stock.17
It is in this context of a severe housing
shortage, serious air pollution problems,
chronic traffic congestion, a critical lack of
open space, and the ever-present appetite of
the medical institutions for land that one must
view the struggle over Parcel C. Parcel C was
not just about one plot of land, or one envi-
ronmental hazard. It was a reaction to histo-
ry—a history in which powerful institutions
and callous government agencies have contin-
ually mistreated a small and vulnerable com-
munity. It represented a critical step in the
struggle for Chinatown’s survival. Even if the
Chinatown community did not win the battle
over Parcel C, it would send a message to
Tufts and New England Medical Center—
that the community could, and would, fight
for its survival.
Background and History of
Parcel C
Parcel C is a small plot of land bordered by
Oak Street, Nassua Street, May Place, and
Ash Street.18 It is in the heart of residential
Chinatown.19 Oak Street, which is the major
street abutting Parcel C, is residential, and
measures only thirty feet wide.20 Yet literally
hundreds of people travel Oak Street on foot
every day, probably because it serves as the
bridge between the western and eastern half of
residential Chinatown. Oak Street is also the
location of Acorn Day Care and its adjoining
children’s playground.
Acorn Day Care, which is the only public
day care facility in Chinatown, is five feet
away from Parcel C. In fact, it is so close to
Parcel C that New England Medical Center’s
proposed garage would have been near
enough to this building’s fire escape to violate
the fire code.21 Across the street from Parcel
C is a row of modest brick homes and a hous-
ing development under construction.22
About one hundred feet away from Parcel
C, there is a complex that houses an elemen-
tary school, a community health center, and a
social services provider.23 This complex also
contains a low-income housing development
for the elderly and disabled.24 Also one hun-
dred feet from Parcel C is another low income
housing development.25 As one can see from
this description, Parcel C is a very hazardous
place to put a 455-car garage.
The history of Parcel C extends back to
the time of urban renewal. A large portion of
the parcel was formed when the Boston
Redevelopment Authority seized and demol-
ished the homes of several Chinese resi-
dents.26 After the land was taken, the
Authority entered into an agreement with
Tufts and New England Medical Center in
which the medical institutions were given the
right to buy the land.27 Tufts and New
England Medical Center made various plans
for the land, but ultimately never did anything
with it. For over twenty years, the land lay
vacant.
On an adjoining piece of land, the
Chinatown community was making good use
of one of the few pieces spared from urban
renewal. The Quincy School Community
Council, one of the largest human service
providers in Chinatown, had been renting a
small three-story building from the Boston
Redevelopment Authority since 1969. In that
building, the group held English as a Second
Language programs, conducted an after
school program, and ran Acorn Day Care.
In 1986, New England Medical Center
submitted a proposal to build an 850-car
garage on Parcel C. This proposal would have
meant the demolition of the Acorn Day Care
building and the adjoining children’s play-
ground. The concept of a such a huge garage
was immediately greeted with opposition by
both the Chinatown Neighborhood Council,
City Hall’s advisory group on Chinatown
matters, and the Boston Redevelopment
Authority. This garage proposal was ultimate-
ly defeated.28
In 1988, in an effort to preserve the Acorn
Day Care building for community use, the
Boston Redevelopment Authority announced
its decision to hand over title of the land and
building to the Quincy School Community
Council.29 New England Medical Center’s
reaction was swift and callous. The hospital
sued the Authority to stop the transfer of the
Acorn Day Care building and playground.30
The community immediately protested
New England Medical Center’s decision to
sue.31 The Mayor of Boston declared that the
City would not accept the hospital’s attempt
to interfere with the transfer of the Acorn Day
Care building and would not be intimidated
by the hospital’s lawsuit.32 Subsequently, a
court threw out New England Medical
Center’s lawsuit.33 New England Medical
Center appealed, but before the appeal was
heard, the City, Chinatown, and New
England Medical Center negotiated a settle-
ment.34
As part of the settlement, New England
Medical Center agreed to sell back a plot of
land neighboring Acorn Day Care and to
refrain from opposing the Boston
Redevelopment Authority’s transfer of the
Acorn building to the community. In return,
New England Medical Center was given the
right to buy two neighboring parcels of
land.35 Because the land faced Washington
Street, a major artery, it was very lucrative.
New England Medical Center immediately
made plans to build two huge, nine-story
buildings on these new parcels, totaling over
370,000 gross square feet.
As for Chinatown, it got the Acorn Day
Care building and playground.36 Chinatown
also got a commitment from the Boston
Redevelopment Authority and New England
Medical Center that the remaining parcel
formed out of the lawsuit’s settlement would
be reserved for community use.37 Thus,
Parcel C was born. The Authority promised
that Parcel C would be reserved for a commu-
nity center, and pledged its assistance in build-
ing this center. The Authorities first steps
toward fulfilling this promise consisted of pro-
viding a $15,000 technical assistance grant and
helping six community groups to incorporate
as the Chinatown Community Center, Inc.38
The Chinatown Community Center, Inc.
would be the developer of Parcel C.
A Deal is Cut
By 1993, things had changed. Mayor
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Raymond Flynn was gone. The Boston
Redevelopment Authority had a new executive
director,39 and a multimillion dollar debt.40
The Chinatown Neighborhood Council was
composed of business interests instead of
community activists, and New England
Medical Center was funding the Council’s
operating expenses.41 The real estate boom,
which was supposed to fund the Chinatown
Community Center, had gone bust. The
economy was still in a recession, and money
was scarce.
In recognition of these realities, the
Chinatown Community Center, Inc. scaled
back its plans for a community center from
90,000 to 50,000 square feet. The group also
approached New England Medical Center
about forming a joint venture. To their dis-
may, New England Medical Center’s only
offer for a joint project was to build a small
10,000 square foot community center in
exchange for the rest of Parcel C. Yet again,
New England Medical Center wanted to build
a huge garage on Parcel C. To no one’s sur-
prise, the Chinatown Community Center, Inc.
rejected this offer immediately.42
But the Chinatown Community Center,
Inc. was not the only place New England
Medical Center could pitch its offer. New
England Medical Center approached the next
logical player. The hospital made an offer to
the Boston Redevelopment Authority that an
agency swimming in red ink found too good
to pass up—-two million dollars for Parcel C
and an easy approval process. Needless to say,
the Authority became a major backer of the
hospital’s garage plans.43
New England Medical Center also made
the same offer to the Chinatown
Neighborhood Council. In return for Parcel
C, New England Medical Center would build
a 10,000 square foot community center—or
even better, provide $1.8 million in cash to
the community. The money would be given in
trust to the Council for distribution.44
In March 1993, the Chinatown communi-
ty found out about the New England Medical
Center deal. A veritable storm of criticism
hailed forth. On May 17, 1993, when New
England Medical Center formally presented
its deal for approval to the Chinatown
Neighborhood Council, over one hundred
community members showed up to the
Council’s meeting. For the next several hours,
speaker after speaker decried the hospital’s
garage proposal. Despite this intense opposi-
tion, the lure of 1.8 million dollars proved too
much. The Chinatown Neighborhood
Council approved the deal that night.45
The Community Organizes
With the approval of the New England
Medical Center garage proposal by the
Council, community activists and residents
geared up for the next round of the struggle.
Many were veterans of previous community
struggles against Tufts and New England
Medical Center, City Hall, and other govern-
ment agencies. In fact, two of the groups that
belong to the Chinatown Community Center,
Inc. specialized in grassroots advocacy and
community organizing.46 Experienced in
protest strategies, media relations, and com-
munity mobilization, they immediately went
to work in using all of these avenues to oppose
the hospital’s garage proposal.
Activists soon found out that the Boston
Redevelopment Authority would hold a hear-
ing on June 10, 1993 to determine whether to
give preliminary approval to the hospital’s
garage proposal. The day before the hearing, a
rally was organized in front of New England
Medical Center to demonstrate the opposition
of the Chinatown community to the garage
proposal. Over 250 people showed up to
protest.47 It was the beginning of the commu-
nity’s effort to use media against the garage.
Opponents of the garage knew that despite
whatever angle the press would take, putting
out the facts in the media alone would garner
them public support.
The opposition against the garage did not
simply consist of a rally. Residents and com-
munity activists also began circulating peti-
tions well before the June 10 hearing. By the
time the hearing was held, opponents of the
garage had over 2,500 signatures ready to
deliver to the board of the Boston
Redevelopment Authority. At the June 10
hearing, community residents and activists
again spoke louder against the garage. And yet
again, the attraction of 2 milion dollars pulled
harder than the public’s protest. Despite
tremendous opposition from the Chinatown
community, the Boston Redevelopment
Authority gave its preliminary approval to the
deal with New England Medical Center.48
Even worse, the Boston Redevelopment
Authority totally discounted the community’s
opposition to the proposed garage. Instead,
the Authority had the audacity to suggest that
the Chinatown community actually favored
the proposed garage because the Chinatown
Neighborhood Council had approved the
deal. The Authority and City Hall held out
the council as the true representatives of the
Chinatown community, despite the fact that
2,500 community members had registered
their protest against the garage propsal.49 Like
so many minority “leaders” that are recog-
nized as legitimate by white governments, the
Chinatown Neighborhood Council acted as
City Hall’s puppet, approving actions that
were ultimately detrimental to the Chinatown
community. The Boston Redevelopment
Authority believed it could shield itself against
criticism using these minority stooges.
After the June 10 Boston Redevelopment
Authority hearing, the struggle against the
garage looked bleak. City Hall had taken its
position, and proved immune to community
protest. The Boston Redevelopment
Authority had its token Chinatown group to
hold out as “true community representatives.”
The power of money appeared too strong to
fight. Yet community members were not will-
ing to give up the struggle. It was too great an
injustice and harm, for them to ignore.
Despite what looked like formidable odds, the
activists and residents prepared to continue
the struggle.
The first and most critical step for
activists was have the community itself define
the goals and strategies of the struggle against
the garage. Too many times, an ostensibly
community-based struggle leaves out the par-
ticipation of the people most critical to the
process—the residents, the workers, the peo-
ple most affected by the outcome of the strug-
gle. Added to that tendency, was the historical
exclusion of Chinatown residents, especially
the elderly and recent immigrants, from the
political process due to language and cultural
barriers. It would be too easy for the Parcel C
struggle to become a struggle of and by expe-
rienced English-speaking activists, in which
the Chinatown community itself had no real
ownership.
Given the level of emotion Parcel C pro-
voked among residents, however, it was not
difficult to take measures that would prevent
the community from being disempowerment
by its own activists as well as by New England
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Medical Center and the City. The opposition
to the garage proposal was formalized into an
inclusive coalition, called the Coalition to
Protect Parcel C for Chinatown. The steering
committee of the Coalition was elected by
community members at an open meeting.
Four of the nine Coalition steering committee
members were Chinatown residents. Both
Coalition steering committee meetings and
general meetings were conducted in
Cantonese and English.
During the first open meeting, the com-
munity made clear its goal—no garage on
Parcel C at all costs. The community didn’t
want any compromises. Residents stated very
firmly that their opposition to the hospital’s
garage was stemmed from the environmental
dangers that a garage would pose to them,
their families, and their loved ones. Elderly
women and teenagers expressed their fears
that the additional traffic generated by the
garage would cause more accidents. Three
residents had already died after being struck
by cars near the Parcel C site.50 Residents
were also concerned that the air pollution
caused by cars using the garage would harm
their health. They felt no amount of addition-
al community benefits money was worth those
risks.
A structure for the Coalition was also
developed during that first open meeting. The
steering committee would make day-to-day
decisions for the Coalition. Important deci-
sions, it was understood, would be brought
back to the community during open general
meetings. Subcommittees were also formed in
specific areas: media relations, legal strategy,
outreach to Chinatown community members,
and outreach to other communities. The
Coalition was ready for a sophisticated, multi-
faceted, and well-orchestrated fight. 
After the meeting, these committees
quickly went about devising strategies in their
respective areas. Many of these strategies were
ultimately successful, although they took
longer than the Coalition had ever imagined.
It was not until the media campaign had gen-
erated over seventy-five articles and several
television broadcasts, the community organiz-
ers had several rallies, after a year and a half of
legal advocacy, and thousands of letters, that
the Coalition had an effect. But ultimately,
that effect was a victory, and well worth the
effort.
The Environmental Front
As the mainstream public has finally recog-
nized, communities of color are dispropor-
tionately impacted by environmental haz-
ards.51 Chinatown has not been spared this
environmental racism. From the air pollution
caused by the Massachusetts Turnpike and the
Southeast Expressway to the overcrowding
caused by the medical institutions’ expansion,
the residents of this community have always
been burdened by numerous environmental
dangers.52 A garage on Parcel C seemed only
to further this history of environmental injus-
tice against Chinatown.
Chinatown residents did not need a grow-
ing nationwide awareness of the ravages of
environmental racism to understand what was
happening in their community. The first reac-
tion that residents had toward the garage pro-
posal was alarm over the environmental con-
sequences of several thousand additional new
cars that a 455-car garage would generate.
The burgeoning movement against environ-
mental racism, however, did prove of great
assistance in the struggle against the proposed
garage.
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Because of the new awareness of environ-
mental racism, the Coalition was able to form
alliances with and obtain the assistance of
groups that would have never previously got-
ten involved in a struggle in Chinatown. Both
mainstream environmental groups, such as the
Sierra Club and the American Lung
Association, and environmental justice groups,
such as the Environmental Diversity Forum,
joined with the Coalition. The Coalition was
able to obtain legal support from the
Conservation Law Foundation, which advo-
cated against the proposed garage with state
environmental agencies and provided advice
and support to the Coalition’s own lawyers.
Because of the strength of their reputations
with state environmental officials and their
specialized knowledge of environmental
issues, the support of these environmental
groups proved invaluable. 
One of the most difficult obstacles the
Coalition faced was getting scientific and
technical consultants to counter New England
Medical Center’s scientific studies. Most of
the private consultants in the Boston area
were too expensive for a grassroots organiza-
tion. Fortunately, the Coalition was able to
obtain the assistance of an affiliate of the
Department of Environmental Health at
Boston University’s School of Public Health.
Because of their emphasis on urban environ-
mental problems, these experts could provide
scientific information on the dangers of air
pollution in minority communities. They also
referred the Coalition to an inexpensive firm
that conducted air pollution monitoring.
One of the most important allies of the
Coalition came not from the environmental
movement, but the health care movement.
Health Care for All, a Massachusetts-based
advocacy organization, had been targeting the
wealthy Boston teaching hospitals that were
not fulfilling their obligations toward the
urban communities in which they were situat-
ed. Because of the controversy over Parcel C,
Health Care for All chose to focus on New
England Medical Center, and joined hand-in-
hand with the Coalition.53 Health Care for All
proved most effective in bringing critical pub-
lic attention to New England Medical Center,
especially when the group revealed that the
hospital had paid thousands of dollars for
antique pillow cushions for its CEO.
Finally, with a heightened awareness that
acts of environmental racism were not isolated
occurrences, the Coalition itself saw the
advantage of establishing working relation-
ships with other communities of color that
were being threatened by environmental haz-
ards.54 With lines of communications now
open, these communities were able to give
each other technical assistance, and more
importantly, moral support. The groups
engaged in struggles against environmental
racism were able to see that they were not
alone, and to derive support from one anther’s
victories. When the struggles of each commu-
nity group started to wear them down, that
moral support was the most critical factor of
all.
The Referendum
As discussed earlier, one of the most impor-
tant results of the Parcel C struggle was the
opportunity it provided for community mem-
bers, especially the elderly and the young, to
have a voice in what happened in Chinatown.
Too many times, residents and community
members had been denied the ability to par-
ticipate in decisions affecting Chinatown. The
Parcel C struggle was different—the Coalition
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was dedicated to ensuring that residents and
community members would make the ultimate
decision about the proposed garage.
The Coalition hit upon the perfect
method of both providing a means for the res-
idents and community to have their voices
heard, and showing City Hall and the rest of
Boston conclusively that the Chinatown com-
munity did not want a garage on Parcel C.
The Coalition would sponsor a referendum
over the proposed garage. It would be true
democracy in action. Each and every resident
and community member would be given the
opportunity to vote on whether they wanted a
garage on Parcel C.55
To maximize the credibility of the refer-
endum, the Coalition brought in a neutral
third party to run the actual voting—the
American Friends Service Committee. The
Coalition knew that any referendum it spon-
sored would be attacked by the Chinatown
Neighborhood Council and New England
Medical Center as unfair, but the involvement
of the AFSC would enhance the legitimacy of
the referendum to the media and the general
public. Voting would take place over the
course of two days, and would be monitored
by the AFSC and volunteers approved by that
group.
On September 12 and 13, 1993, over
1,700 members of the Chinatown community
voted on New England Medical Center’s
garage proposal. By an enormous margin of
1692 to 42, the community overwhelmingly
rejected the hospital’s garage.56 The Coalition
was ecstatic. This proved once and for all that
Chinatown did not want a garage on Parcel C.
City Hall could waver on the Chinatown
Neighborhood Council’s approval as much as
it wanted—no group of puppets could speak as
strongly as the community had spoken in the
referendum.
Organizing in a Non-English
Speaking Community
Because many Chinatown residents are recent
immigrants, organizing in Chinatown always
presents unique issues. As mentioned earlier,
over two thirds of Chinatown residents speak
Chinese at home. About 35 percent of
Chinatown residents speak little or no
English, and less than one third of Chinatown
residents speak English very well.57 Many of
the strongest opponents of the garage were
the elderly, who were also the least likely to
speak any English. In fact, two members of
the Coalition’s steering committee were limit-
ed English speakers.
Fortunately, many of the activists in the
Coalition were bilingual, and had extensive
experience in community organizing in
Chinatown. Rallies, petition drives, and letter-
writing campaigns were all conducted in
English and Chinese. The Coalition knew the
strategies and methods to get non-English
speakers, who might otherwise become very
alienated from the struggle, to become active.
By outreaching to Chinatown residents
through the Chinese language press and door-
to-door leafleting, the Coalition was able to
bring residents out en masse.
One method that the Coalition used very
successfully in keeping non-English speakers
and the Chinatown community as a whole
informed was to hold regular community-
wide general meetings, conducted in Chinese
and in English. Before each of these meetings,
the Coalition would publicize the meeting
extensively by calling people, leafleting, and
publishing notices in the Chinese press to
ensure that a wide segment of the Chinatown
community attended.
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The Coalition used these meetings to
update the Chinatown community about
recent events in the Parcel C struggle, such as
communications with New England Medical
Center and the City, the success or failure of
legal strategies, and the Coalition’s own future
plans. The meetings were also an optimal time
for getting the residents to be proactive.
Coalition members would ask those attending
the meetings to write letters, sign petitions, or
help in preparing events. The meetings also
helped sustain the momentum of the struggle
and move it forward. Most important, the
meetings were critical in receiving general
community input. At the general meetings,
the Coalition steering committee would have
residents vote on important issues. Without
these regular meetings, the community would
have become isolated from the struggle.
Victories in Environmental Law
One of the major victories of the Coalition’s
fight against New England Medical Center’s
garage was in the legal arena. With the assis-
tance of Greater Boston Legal Services, the
Coalition was able to persuade a state environ-
mental agency to require New England
Medical Center to conduct a full environmen-
tal review of its proposed garage. Ultimately,
this environmental review took over a year.
This not only forced New England Medical
Center to justify its garage on environmental
grounds, but it gave the Coalition the time
that it needed to achieve a victory through the
political process.
Because the garage proposal involved the
sale of land by the Boston Redevelopment
Authority, New England Medical Center had
to fulfill the requirement of the Massachusetts
Environmental Policy Act.58 The hospital was
required to give a preliminary environmental
report to the state environmental agency. On
the basis of that preliminary report, the state
agency would decide whether or not to
require a full environmental impact report
from the hospital.59
In its report, New England Medical
Center included scientific studies demonstrat-
ing that it did not need to prepare a full
impact report.60 The Coalition knew that it
had to respond to the preliminary report. It
had to convince the state agency to require the
hospital to prepare a full environmental
impact report. The state environmental
agency offered the best chance for govern-
ment intervention on the side of the commu-
nity—it was a neutral party, not a city agency,
and could not be bought off or pressured by
the hospital. Lawyers from Greater Boston
Legal Services drafted a lengthy response to
the hospital’s report. Coalition members and
allies, such as the Sierra Club and the
American Lung Association, also sent in
responses. And when the state agency held a
hearing on the Parcel C garage proposal, the
Coalition was prepared. 
At the August 31, 1993 hearing on the
hospital’s garage proposal, the Coalition pre-
sented a tremendous amount of evidence
against the garage to the state environmental
agency—testimony from Oak Street residents
that lived across from Parcel C, reports from
the staff at South Cove Community Health
Center, data that volunteers collected on traf-
fic volume around Parcel C, and even a graph-
ic picture showing the proposed garage 5 feet
away from Acorn Day Care.61 Despite their
unfamiliarity with environmental law, the
Coalition and its attorneys were ultimately
persuasive. The community won a resounding
victory when the state environmental agency
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ordered New England Medical Center to con-
duct a full environmental review of its garage
proposal. Even better, the state agency
ordered the hospital to focus on the areas of
air pollution, traffic, and open space and
recreation—the very areas that the community
was most concerned about.62
Of course, both the Coalition and the
lawyers realized that this was only an environ-
mental review process, and could not actually
stop the hospital’s garage. State law only
forced the hospital to study the environmental
dangers of the garage and to mitigate them.
Still, this victory gave the Coalition more time
to conduct its political and media campaign.
More important, the state environmental
agency had validated the concerns of the
Chinatown community about the hazards of
New England Medical Center’s proposal.
It took New England Medical Center
until February 28, 1993 to complete the full
environmental impact report. Even though
the report took eight months to complete, the
Coalition realized upon reading it that the
report was still incomplete and full of misrep-
resentations. The Coalition realized that it
had grounds to request a second, more com-
plete and more accurate environmental impact
report. Again, the Coalition’s lawyers sent a
lengthy response to the hospital’s report,
refuting inaccuracies and pointing out omis-
sions page by page. Individual Coalition mem-
bers, the Coalition’s architect, the
Conservation Law Foundation, the
Coalition’s scientific experts, and Health Care
for All also sent in responses.
The Coalition again prevailed. The state
environmental agency ruled that New
England Medical Center’s full environmental
impact report was inadequate and deficient,
and ordered the hospital to prepare a second,
supplemental report.63 The Coalition was
ecstatic about this victory. Not only had the
state agency validated their concerns about the
environmental hazards of the proposed
garage, the agency had also validated the com-
munity’s long-standing sentiment that New
England Medical Center had a habit of mak-
ing misrepresentations and omissions. Finally,
there was a government agency, unlike the
City, that was not willing to let the hospital
get away with it.
Translation of Environmental
Documents
One goal the Coalition developed was to have
the above environmental documents translat-
ed into Chinese. The Coalition wanted the
residents to be able to read and comment
upon the documents for themselves. After all,
there was no one better qualified to look for
factual flaws in New England Medical
Center’s studies on traffic and environment in
Chinatown than the residents who lived there.
Unfortunately, the Coalition did not have the
resources to translate the environmental
impact report, which was comprised of 240
pages of text and 680 pages of appendices.64
Therefore, the Coalition asked the state envi-
ronmental agency to require New England
Medical Center to translate the document.65
The Coalition wanted the environmental
documents to be translated so that the non-
English speaking residents could meaningfully
participate in the environmental review
process. After all, without a Chinese transla-
tion, many of the people who would bear the
brunt of the environmental ills of the pro-
posed garage, and who were most concerned
about the issue, would be excluded. On the
other hand, obtaining a Chinese translation of
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the environmental review documents would
be another step, like the referendum, toward
eliminating the historical exclusion of Chinese
speakers.
The Coalition prevailed in part. Because
the Coalition had made its request for a trans-
lation after the full environmental report had
been prepared, the state agency felt the
Coalition’s request was too late. The state
agency, however, did decide that parts of the
second, supplemental environmental report,
which had not yet been prepared, should be
translated into Chinese.66 This also constitut-
ed a major victory for the Coalition and many
of its member groups, since it was the first
time that a government agency in
Massachusetts had required the translation of
an environmental document into Chinese.
Not only did the state agency require a
Chinese translation of the supplemental envi-
ronmental report, the agency also proposed
that New England Medical Center meet with
the Coalition, and come to an agreement as to
which portions of the supplemental report
should actually be translated.67 Unlike City
Hall, the state environmental agency was rec-
ognizing the Coalition as an equal, and as the
representative of the Chinatown community.
The state agency was forcing the City and
New England Medical Center to deal with the
Coalition.
Although the supplemental environmental
report was never written, the Coalition’s suc-
cess in this matter alone was a significant out-
come of the Parcel C struggle. The
Coalition’s actions set a precedent in
Massachusetts: when an environmental issue
affects a linguistic minority, translation of crit-
ical documents should be the norm. This was
especially important to Chinatown and the
Massachusetts Asian American community,
because government agencies usually translat-
ed documents for these groups less often than
for other non-English speaking populations.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the Coalition and the Chinatown
community won its battle against New
England Medical Center’s proposed garage.
The victory took a year and a half, and was by
no means complete. Although the media, the
state environmental agency and the general
public recognized that the Coalition was the
representative body for the Chinatown com-
munity, City Hall and the Mayor’s Office did
not. When the City finally reversed its deci-
sion over Parcel C, it deliberately excluded the
Coalition from the process.
On October 21, 1994, the Coalition
received a call from a reporter at the Boston
Herald. Did they know that the Mayor’s
Office had issued a press release about Parcel
C? New England Medical Center was with-
drawing its garage proposal. In addition,
Mayor Thomas Menino was going to sign an
agreement with the Chinese Consolidated
Benevolent Association over Parcel C. This
agreement would preserve Parcel C for hous-
ing and would forbid all institutional use on
the land. The Benevolent Association was also
going to be given oversight authority over
Parcel C.68
The Coalition was stunned. No one from
the Mayor’s Office had spoken to them about
a settlement. No one had asked them to sit at
the negotiation table or even give their input.
Furthermore, the Benevolent Association was
made up of the same people who sat on the
Chinatown Neighborhood Council, and had
approved the hospital’s garage proposal less
than two years ago. The Coalition had been
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shut out, and the community sold out.
It took a few days for the Coalition mem-
bers to realize they had also won. There
would be no garage on Parcel C. The
Coalition had stopped New England Medical
Center. It was amazing—a grassroots coalition
of residents and organizations had stopped
one of the most powerful institutions in
Boston.
Of course, the Coalition realized there
was, and still is, more work to do. Not only is
the Benevolent Association made up of the
same people as the Neighborhood Council,
but it is notorious for squandering land and
money given to it in trust for the community.
Only a few years ago, the Benevolent
Association had taken land that was given to
them to build housing, and rented it to a
supermarket. The Benevolent Association had
also spent all of the rental income in mysteri-
ous and untraceable ways.69 The Coalition
and its members have the unpleasant task of
ensuring that the same events do not occur
with Parcel C.
Despite the victory over Parcel C, the
community groups and residents that made up
the Coalition have a long, hard road before
there is significant success in the larger strug-
gle—the struggle to preserve Chinatown in
the face of institutional expansion. Even as the
Parcel C fight was concluding, a new proposal
for expansion was being advanced by Tufts
University Schools of Medicine and Nutrition
to build three new high rise buildings in resi-
dential Chinatown.70 It seems that as long as
the medical institutions are around, the strug-
gle for Chinatown’s survival will continue.
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Notes
1. Historically, there is a very close relationship between Tufts University and New England
Medical Center. The hospital has always been the primary teaching affiliate of Tufts University
School of Medicine. Indeed, New England Medical Center and parts of Tufts University became for-
mally one institution since 1962 or earlier, when the two institutions renamed the group "T-
NEMC." The entity T-NEMC was the title-holder of several pieces of real estate within the Tufts-
New England Medical Center facilities. For this reason, even though Tufts and New England
Medical Center later separated into two distinct entities in the mid–1980's, in many respects, they
still function as one institution. 
2. In 1990, the two medical institutions owned 27 percent of the land in Chinatown. Boston
Redevelopment Authority, Chinatown Community Plan (1990), 58 [hereinafter "Chinatown
Community Plan"]. Since 1990, New England Medical Center has acquired the two parcels which
were part of the settlement of its lawsuit, discussed below. These two parcels total over 370 gross
square feet. New England Medical Center, Draft Environmental Impact Report for Parcel C Garage,
1–27.
3. The Chinatown Coalition, Chinatown Community Assessment Report, 13 (1994) (Citing Boston
Redevelopment Authority's Summary of the 1990 United States Census) [hereinafter "Chinatown
Coalition Report"].
4. Ibid., at Appendix A, vi.
5. Chinatown Coalition Report at 13 (Citing Boston Redevelopment Authority's Summary of the
1990 United States Census).
6. Chinatown Community Plan, 64.
7. This translates into a ratio of about 9,600 persons per acre of open space. Compare this to the
ratio of persons to acre of open space in the wealthy, predominantly white neighborhood of Back
Bay/Beacon Hill, which has a ratio of 210 persons per acre. Chinatown is also one of the few neigh-
borhoods in Boston without a public library branch. It has very few outdoor recreational facilities.
Chinatown Coalition Report, 26–27.
8. Chinatown Community Plan, 30–36. For example, in September 1994, when a mixed income
housing development in Chinatown began to accept applications for rentals, over 1,600 people waited
in line for eighty-eight units. ["1,000 Wait in Chinatown for Hours for New Housing," Boston Globe,
August 28, 1994]. Chinatown has the lowest vacancy rate in Boston—3.2 percent. There are 1,431
units of housing for a population of about 5,000. Chinatown Community Plan, 31.
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9. Chinatown Community Plan, 31–32.
10. See Kennedy, Planning the City Upon a Hill, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1992),
200–220.
11. Boston Redevelopment Authority, Diagnostic Report of Residents to be Relocated—South Cove
Urban Renewal Project (1967), 7.
12. See 1996 Cooperation Agreement between the Boston Redevelopment Authority and Tufts-New
England Medical Center.
13. Chinatown Community Plan, 23.
14. During the early 1990s the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection's monitor
for carbon monoxide at Essex Street in Chinatown showed several violations of limits set by the
Environmental Protection Agency. Furthermore, in 1987, carbon monoxide levels at the Kneeland
Street portal of the Dewey Square Tunnel, adjacent to Chinatown, were estimated at eight different
locations. These carbon monoxide levels were some of the highest in the City of Boston. At five out
of the eight locations, modeled projections of carbon monoxide levels exceeded the EPA's limit.
Massachusetts Department of Public Works, Final Supplement Environmental Impact Report for
Central Artery (I-93)/Tunnel (I-90) Project, 4.11.
15. Chinatown suffers from "chronic traffic congestion, while pedestrian safety in the heavily con-
centrated residential areas has been threatened. Chinatown Community Plan, 18. In addition, "the
neighborhood is also fragmented and isolated by heavy traffic in its midst or circulating at its borders,
while it suffers from a deteriorating environmental quality." Ibid., 64.
16. Palmer, "Pike Exit to Back Bay Pushed," Boston Globe, Nov. 15, 1994.
17. Chinatown Community Plan, 23.
18. Suffolk County Registry of Deeds, Book 16512, 171.
19. Chinatown Community Plan, 138A.
20. New England Medical Center, Draft Environmental Impact Report for Parcel C Garage, 1–4.
21. Testimony of Chia-Ming Sze, Architect, before the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs,
August 31, 1993.
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22. Oak Terrace, which was completed in December 1994.
23. Quincy Elementary School, South Cove Community Health Center, and Quincy School
Community Council. See Chinatown Coalition Report, 29.
24. Quincy Towers.
25. Tai Tung Village, which has 240 units of housing.
26. See Suffolk County Registry of Deeds, Book 8072, 276–288; Suffolk County Registry of Deeds,
Book 8094, 639–647.
27. The 1966 Cooperation Agreement between the Boston Redevelopment Authority and Tufts-
New England Medical Center provides that the hospital could acquire certain parcels of land in the
South Cove Urban Renewal area, including land that now makes up Parcel C.
28. Bagley, "NEMC Car Garage is Rejected by No Vote in Neighborhood Council," Sampan,
February 1987.
29. Pantridge, "Medical Center, BRA Face Off in Chinatown," Boston Herald, June 30, 1988.
30. Ibid.
31. "Protesters Fight Medical Center Expansion Plan," Boston Herald, July 8, 1988.
32. O'Malley, "NEMC Files Suit to Take Oak Street Building," Sampan, July 6, 1988.
33. See New England Medical Center v. Boston Redevelopment Authority. Suffolk Sup. Ct. 88-3649
(Decision denying application for permanent injunction dated November 16, 1988), appeal denied,
(Appeals Ct. Docket No. 88-J-784). Further appeal of the case was dismissed by Joint Motion from
all parties in 1991.
34. See Land Disposition Agreement, Suffolk County Registry of Deeds,
Book 16512, 175.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. New England Medical Center, Master Plan 1990–2000 (1990).
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38. Lowe, "Center Commitments Should be Honored," Sampan, March 19, 1993.
39. The new Executive Director, Paul Barrett, would become well-known for his promotion of mas-
sive institutional expansion projects at the expense of local communities. See Gendron, "Big Projects
Pit Residents Against City Hall," Boston Herald, July 20, 1993.
40. See Walker, "Flynn Allies May Face Layoffs," Boston Globe, March 31, 1994.
41. See New England Medical Center, Draft Environmental Impact Report for Parcel C Garage,
8–3.
42. Lowe, "Center Commitments Should be Honored," Sampan, March 19, 1993.
43. Cassidy, "Chinatown to Vote on Garage Proposal," Boston Globe, May 15, 1993.
44. Tong, "Chinatown Neighborhood Council Approves Controversial Garage Plan," Boston Globe,
May 23, 1993.
45. Ibid.
46. These groups were the Chinese Progressive Association and the Asian American Resource
Workshop.
47. See Gendron, "Chinatown Residents Protest New Garage Plan," Boston Herald, June 9, 1993.
48. "BRA Supports NEMC Garage on Oak Street," Sampan, June 18, 1993.
49. Ibid.
50. See "The Real Problem with Parcel C," Boston Globe, June 3, 1993. One of the streets near Parcel
C, Washington Street, was identified as one of the twenty-six most dangerous locations for pedestrian
fatalities in the City of Boston. Boston Transportation Department—Pedestrian Safety Task Force,
Report on Pedestrian Safety (1992), 9.
51. See, e.g., Executive Order 12898, printed at 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (February 16, 1994) (mandating
that all Federal agencies make achieving environmental justice for minority populations a part of their
missions).
52. See section A, supra, notes 12-16.
53. See Gendron, "Activists Slam NEMC Service Record" Boston Herald, November 10, 1993.
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54. The Coalition established working relationships with the Coalition Against the Asphalt Plant,
Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative, and the Environmental Diversity Forum.
55. Voting in the referendum was limited to Chinatown residents and Asian Americans in
Massachusetts. The reason that all Asian Americans in Massachusetts were permitted to vote was
because so many non-Chinatown residents had a stake in what happened in Chinatown. Chinatown is
really the heart of the Asian American community in Massachusetts, and in some ways, all of New
England. Because of institutional expansion and urban renewal, the very ills that had brought about
the Parcel C struggle, many Chinese Americans had been prevented from living in Chinatown or had
been driven out. Even though these Chinese Americans lived in Quincy or Allston-Brighton, they
still needed Chinatown for its groceries, its ESL classes, its employment agencies, its community
health center, and its vocational training classes.
56. Gendron, "Chinatown Vote Says No to Garage," Boston Herald, September 15, 1993.
57. Chinatown Coalition Report, 13 and Appendix A, vi.
58. Mass. Gen. Law, ch. 30, secs. 61 and 62.
59. Code of Massachusetts Regulations, ch. 301, Part 11.
60. New England Medical Center, Environmental Notification Form for the Parcel C Garage
Project (July, 1993).
61. Van Schuyver, "State Hears Opposition to Chinatown Garage Plan," Boston Globe, September 1,
1993.
62. Certificate of the Secretary of Environmental Affairs on the Environmental Notification Form
for the Parcel C Garage (September 9, 1993).
63. Certificate of the Secretary of Environmental Affairs on the Draft Environmental Impact Report
for the Parcel C Garage (April 29, 1994).
64. Actually, the Coalition did not want a full translation of all 240 pages, because the full environ-
mental impact report was written in highly technical and obtuse language. Instead, the Coalition
wanted an understandable, but thorough, abstract of the significant portions of the report. The diffi-
culty with so many of these environmental review documents, which are supposed to be written in
terms comprehensible to the general public, is that they are not understandable to the average reader.
65. This strategy was actually suggested to the Coalition's attorneys by Luke Cole, an attorney at the
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Center on Race, Poverty, and the Environment, who had successfully used it in an environmental
struggle involving a Spanish-speaking community.
66. Certificate of the Secretary of Environmental Affairs on the Draft Environmental Impact Report
for the Parcel C Garage, 7–8.
67. Ibid.
68. Gendron, "Menino: Developer Puts the Brakes on Chinatown Garage," Boston Herald, October
22, 1994.
69. "CCBA Uses Community Housing Money to Cover Its Own Expenses," Sampan, March 18,
1994.
70. "Tufts Plan Questioned at Chinatown Meeting," Sampan, August 5, 1994.
